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1. Introduction 
Changes in fiscal institutions tend to be driven by fiscal problems. The on-going reforms 
of the European stability pact are one example. So are the changes in national fiscal 
frameworks occurring or being discussed in many EU countries at the moment. These 
changes include the strengthening or setting up of independent national fiscal watchdogs, 
fiscal councils, which has recently been endorsed by the European Commission (2010a,b) 
and EU ministers of finance in the van Rompuy Task Force (2010). 
  In Sweden there was a radical fiscal reform in the late 1990s. This occurred as a 
response to a fiscal crisis in the first half of the 1990s of similar proportions as the 
ongoing crises in, for example, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the UK (Figure 1). 
Sweden got out of its crisis through a tough consolidation programme which turned a 
fiscal deficit of 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1993 to a surplus of 3.7 per cent in 2000 (see, for 
example, Henriksson 2007). 
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The budget consolidation was followed up by the establishment of a new fiscal 
framework including four main pillars:
1 
  A top-down approach for the central government budget. The Parliament first 
decides overall expenditures and their allocation among different expenditure 
areas. Once this is done, it is not possible to increase a particular expenditure 
without cutting down other expenditures within the same area. 
  A surplus target for government net lending of one per cent of GDP over a 
business cycle. 
  An  expenditure ceiling for central government, which is set three years in 
advance. 
  A balanced budget requirement for local governments. 
 
The fiscal rules have largely been followed. As a result, government net lending in 2000-
2007 was 1.3 per cent of GDP. Hence, it is clear that the establishment of the Fiscal 
Policy Council (FPC) in 2007 was not triggered by any acute fiscal problems. Instead, it 
was inspired by theoretical considerations. 
  The idea of a fiscal council in Sweden was first raised in the discussion on whether 
the country should join the euro. The issue was – for the foreseeable future – settled in a 
referendum in 2003, which decided against the euro. Before the referendum, a 
government commission analysed the requirements on fiscal policy in the event of euro 
membership. The commission worried that fiscal policy would be too lax in upswings, 
leaving no room for stimulus in downturns. To counter that risk, the establishment of an 
independent council, which would give the government recommendations on fiscal 
policy, was proposed (Swedish Government Commission on Stabilisation Policy in the 
Event of EMU Membership 2002).
2 
  The proposal on a fiscal policy council did not go down well with the Social 
Democratic government at the time. It was received more positively by the liberal-
conservative opposition. The then chief economist of the Moderates (the Swedish Tory 
                                                 
1 See Budget Bill (2009) or Swedish Fiscal Policy Council (2009) for more detailed accounts of the 
Swedish fiscal framework. 
2 The commission’s proposal had been preceded by earlier proposals by Calmfors (1999, 2001, 2002). The 
commission was heavily influenced by a background paper by Wyplosz (2002). The commission’s 
proposal on a fiscal policy council was later further developed by Calmfors (2003, 2005).   3
Party), Anders Borg, endorsed the proposal (Borg 2003). When becoming Minister for 
Finance after the liberal-conservative election victory in 2006, Borg was the driving force 
behind the setting-up of the FPC. The council was presented as an important addition to 
the already existing fiscal framework that would help further safeguard fiscal discipline. 
Hence, one can see the establishment of the council as resulting from the same 
determination to avoid fiscal crisis in the future as explained the introduction of the fiscal 
framework in the late 1990s.
3 
 
2. The council’s remit 
According to its instruction (Förordning 2007:760), the Swedish FPC is to: 
1.  Assess to what extent the government’s fiscal objectives are achieved. The 
objectives include long-run sustainability, the surplus target, the central 
government expenditure ceiling and that fiscal policy is consistent with the 
cyclical situation. 
2.  Evaluate whether economic developments are in line with healthy long-run 
growth and sustainable high employment. 
3.  Examine the clarity of the government’s Budget Bill and Spring Fiscal Policy 
Bill with respect to the grounds given for economic policy and the motivations 
for policy proposals. 
4.  Monitor and evaluate the quality of the government’s economic forecasts as 
well as the underlying models. 
  
The council is also to “work to achieve an increased public discussion in society of 
economic policy”. The only output formally required is an annual report. To put the 
activities of the FPC in perspective, they are compared with the fiscal watchdogs of ten 
other countries in Table 1.
4 A fiscal council is characterised as much by what it does not 
do as by what it does. Like all other councils in the table, the FPC does both ex-ante and 
ex-post evaluations of fiscal policy and analyses long-run fiscal sustainability. But there 
are also tasks that are not performed by the Swedish FPC. Among those are forecasting 
                                                 
3 See also Calmfors (2010a) for a more detailed discussion of the genesis of the Swedish FPC. 
4 Tasks of fiscal councils in various countries are discussed in more detail in Calmfors (2010b).   4
(the council only reviews the government’s forecasts), costing of individual policy 
initiatives or detailed budget projections. The main explanation why these tasks have not 
been included is that they were already performed by other preexisting government 
bodies (with considerable independence from the government): the National Institute of 
Economic Research in the case of forecasting and the National Financial Management 
Authority in the case of detailed budget projections. 
  The Swedish FPC belongs to the minority of fiscal watchdogs that do not confine 
themselves to only strictly positive analysis, but who also give normative policy 
recommendations. The FPC also has quite broad tasks, as it is, in addition to assessing 
fiscal policy, also to evaluate employment and growth developments. This broad remit 
may be explained by the fact that employment in 2006 had not returned to the levels that 
prevailed before the 1990’s crisis and that the liberal-conservative parties had made 
employment their main issue in the 2006 election campaign. The government may also 
have seen a likely political gain from an expected endorsement by the council of its 
employment policies, since they include a number of measures recommended by Swedish 
economists (some of them being appointed members of the FPC). 
  Something that differentiates the Swedish council from its counterparts elsewhere 
is that it should also examine the transparency of the government’s policy documents and 
the grounds for policy proposals, that is act also as a kind of “debate watchdog” vis-à-vis 
the government. This is a task which had not been proposed in the international academic 
discussion on fiscal councils, so it was an innovation on the part of the Swedish 
government.
5 A possible explanation could have been a desire to “institutionalise” the 
strong tradition in Sweden of heavy involvement in the economic policy debate and 
monitoring of policy proposals and the logic behind them by academics, a tradition 
threatened today by the strong demands on purely academic publishing within the 
profession which leaves little time for active participation in the public policy debate. 
 
                                                 
5 See Calmfors (2005) or Debrun et al. (2009) for surveys of this discussion.  
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Hungary (Fiscal Council 2008)  X X X  X  X X  X     
Netherlands (Central Planning Bureau 1947)  X X X  X  X X  X    X
8) 
Slovenia (Fiscal Council 2010)  (X)
9)  X
10) X  X X  X    (X)
11) 
Sweden (Fiscal Policy Council 2007)  (X)
12)   X X X  X X  X
13) X
14) 
UK (Office for Budget Responsibility 2010)  X     X X  (X)
15) X     




Notes: The year given in the first column indicates when the institution was first set up. 
1) The Public Sector Borrowing Requirement Section forms part of the High Council of 
Finance, which was established already in 1936. The council as a whole is chaired by the Minister of Finance, but the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement Section has an 
independent standing. 
2) Not own forecasts, but analysis of government forecasts. 
3) On request from a parliamentary committee or a parliamentarian. 
4) Analysis of tax, employment 
and other structural policy as well as environmental policy. 
5) Not own forecasts but description of current economic situation and its foreseeable development. 
6) Fiscal policy is not 
specifically mentioned in the mandate, which is to assess overall economic developments and to help economic policy makers at all levels as well as the general public to arrive at 
informed judgements on economic matters. The economic-policy objectives explicitly mentioned in the Council’s mandate are stability of the price level, a high rate of employment 
and equilibrium in foreign trade and payments together with steady and adequate economic growth. The analyses should also focus on distribution of income and wealth. 
7) According 
to the Council’s mandate recommendations of specific policy measures should not be given. But in practice this seems often to de done. 






issues including tax, employment and regulatory policies as well as resource depletion and financial crises. 
9) The Council is not instructed to provide own forecasts but may base its 
analysis on an independent assessment of economic trends. The council is also to assess the quality of economic forecasts used in the preparation of the national budget. 
10) This 
includes an explicit remit to provide an assessment of the adequacy of set fiscal objectives with the median-term fiscal framework. 
11) In addition to other tasks, the Council shall assess 
the efficiency of implementation of structural policies from the aspect of ensuring long-term sustainability of public finances, economic growth and employment. 
12) Not own forecasts 
but the Council is instructed to evaluate the quality of the government’s macroeconomic forecasts and the models on which they are based. 
13) The Council’s formal remit does not 
include normative policy recommendations, but the Council itself has established the practice of sometimes giving such recommendations on the basis of the policy objectives 
formulated by the government and the parliament. 
14) In addition to the task of assessing whether the government’s fiscal objectives are being achieved, the terms of reference include 
the tasks of evaluating whether economic developments are in line with healthy long-run growth and sustainable high employment, and of examining the clarity of the government’s 
budget proposals and the grounds given for various policy measures. The council should also work to increase public discussion in society of economic policy. 
15) At present there 
exists no policy rule like the earlier golden rule and the sustainable debt rule, but the government has specified a multi-annual budget consolidation plan. 
16) In addition to fiscal and 
budgetary analysis, the CBO has recently adopted, for example, labour market developments, employment policy and climate policy. 
 
 
 3. The institutional set-up 
Formally, the FPC is an agency under the government and the annual report is addressed 
to the government. The council has no formal relationship to the Parliament, but its 
Finance Committee organises a public hearing on the basis of the report with 
participation of the council’s chair and the Minister for Finance. 
  The council has eight members. Six of them are active academics and two are ex-
politicians: one former Social Democratic Minister for Finance and one former vice chair 
of the Moderates (the Swedish Tory Party). There is a small secretariat of four persons. 
The small size of the secretariat means that the bulk of the work is performed by the 
council’s academic members. This is a problem since the academics perform their work 
as side activities to their normal academic employment and the work in the council goes 
far beyond what is a reasonable such side activity. 
 
4. The council’s analyses 
It is difficult in a short space to survey the council’s analyses. But the following has been 
main themes in the reports. 
  The government has been urged to clarify the motives for the choice of one per 
cent of GDP as the surplus target for net lending. In the FPC’s view this 
requires a more explicit weighting of various higher-level, fundamental fiscal 
objectives such as social efficiency (tax smoothing), intergenerational equity 
and precautionary motives (to avoid reaching government debt levels triggering 
large interest rate rises). The FPC has also criticised the lack of clarity on when 
the surplus target of one per cent of GDP, which should apply over a business 
cycle, should be regarded as fulfilled and the large number of indicators used in 
the follow-up which leaves ample room for ambiguous interpretations. 
  A recurring theme has been the need for the government to make its long-run 
fiscal sustainability calculations more transparent, which requires better 
discussion of basic assumptions, explanations of why calculations differ 
between years and reporting of alternative scenarios. 
  In the recession of 2009, when GDP in Sweden was forecast to fall by more 
than four percent, there was fundamental disagreement between the FPC and the   8
government on the appropriate size of fiscal stimulus. The council 
recommended a stronger temporary stimulus (of the order of magnitude of 0.5-1 
per cent of GDP in terms of the structural budget balance) than the government 
had proposed. (According to the government’s ex-post calculations in the 2010 
Budget Bill there was a structural fiscal surplus in 2009 of 2.1 per cent of GDP 
and an actual deficit of only 1.2 per cent of GDP.) 
  The FPC was critical of the government’s attempts to circumvent the 
expenditure ceiling for 2010 by timing the payment of central government 
grants to local governments so that they were recorded in 2009 instead when 
there was more room below the ceiling. The council denounced the use of 
statistical manipulations and recommended instead the introduction of a 
transparent escape clause (allowing breaches of the expenditure ceiling in deep 
recessions). 
  A key government policy to reduce structural unemployment has been the 
introduction of an earned income tax credit. The FPC has argued that the earned 
income tax credit is likely to have a substantial positive effect on employment in 
the long run, but has criticised the government for not being transparent about 
how rises in labour supply – due to the credit – are likely to restrain wages and 
this way create the labour demand necessary for actual employment to increase. 
  The government has also reformed both sickness and unemployment insurance, 
reducing the generosity of these systems. The FPC’s view has been that these 
reforms, too, are likely to raise employment in the long run, but that the 
implementation has caused unnecessary adjustment problems. A change in the 
financing of unemployment benefits, raising employee contributions, has led to 
a mass exodus from unemployment insurance (which is voluntary in Sweden). 
The tightening of eligibility rules for sickness insurance was overhasty and had 
to be accompanied by many reversals of the new rules to accommodate 
unforeseen consequences. 
 
When the FPC takes a stand on the appropriateness of a particular policy, it does so on 
the basis of the objectives stated by the government. For example, when evaluating the   9
earned income tax credit and the reforms of unemployment insurance, the council’s 
positive evaluation has only concerned that the reforms are likely to help the government 
reach its stated employment goals. The council does not take a stand on how the 
employment objective should be traded off against the insurance objective (the objective 
to limit the income loss from unemployment). 
 
5. The council’s impact 
Judging from the reactions of the economics profession, media and politicians, the FPC 
seems to have established itself as an important player in the Swedish economic-policy 
discussion. The annual report receives a lot of attention in the media when it is published, 
but it is also frequently quoted and used as a reference in the debate throughout the year. 
The open hearing on the council’s report in the Parliament is broadcast by one of the state 
television channels. The council’s members are frequently asked to comment on both 
policy proposals and more important economic developments both in Sweden and 
abroad. Both the IMF and the OECD have made positive evaluations of the council’s 
work and recommended an enhanced role for the council (IMF 2010, OECD 2011). In the 
international debate on fiscal watchdogs the Swedish council is often advanced as an 
example (see, for example, Debrun et al. 2009, Lane 2010, Hagemann 2010 and Wren-
Lewis 2010). 
  A well-functioning council should have an ex-ante impact already on the proposals 
made by the government, both through inducing such proposals and through discouraging 
others, but this is notoriously difficult to evaluate. One should not expect too much in 
terms of modifications of proposals already made, since the political cost for 
governments of ex-post changes may be high. Nevertheless, one could point to at least 
three cases where the council has been influential. 
  The first example concerns the degree of fiscal stimulus in 2009/10 which was 
gradually increased relative to the government’s original plans. It may seem odd 
that a fiscal council tries to push the government in the direction of more 
stimulus. But it is not so surprising if one recalls that both the government’s 
cautious fiscal stance and the establishment of the council have the same likely 
cause: a shift to a culture of fiscal discipline after the traumatic fiscal   10
experiences in the 1990s (see Section 1). If no deficit bias exists in fiscal policy, 
different cyclical forecasts can, of course, lead a council to the conclusion that 
the government does not provide enough stimulus in a recession. In addition, a 
government may feel inhibited to undertake stimulus because this could be 
wrongly interpreted as reneging on its medium-term fiscal target. Here, an 
independent council may have more credibility and thus provide “cover” for the 
government to “do the right thing”.
6 
  A second example is the council’s call to the political parties in the 2010 
parliamentary election campaign to avoid committing to measures that would 
permanently worsen the budget balance. This advice received widespread media 
attention and may have strengthened fiscal discipline. 
  Finally, the council was likely instrumental in inducing the government to clarify 
its position on the motives for the fiscal surplus target, its numerical value and 
how adherence to the target is followed up.
7 The government has also responded 
to the calls for improving the transparency of the fiscal sustainability 
calculations. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly the council has had only a small impact in the politically less 
controversial areas of the transparency of fiscal and employment policy, where the 
council has asked for better reporting on government investment and real capital assets as 
well as on active labour market programmes, but where not much has happened.  
 
6. The problems of working in a political environment 
The whole idea of a fiscal council is that it should constrain the behaviour of policy 
makers. It is an expert body designed to give advice based on economic research in a 
highly political environment. It goes without saying that this may not be without its 
problems. The experiences of the Swedish FPC can illustrate this. 
                                                 
6 The argument is similar to the one regarding monetary policy that credibility for an anti-inflationary 
stance gives the central bank larger scope for monetary stimulus in a downturn (see, for example, Wyplosz 
2010). 
7 Clarifications were made in the 2010 Spring Fiscal Policy Bill. They were based on a report by a working 
group in the Ministry of Finance (Finansdepartementet 2010).   11
  When the council was established in 2007, all three opposition parties – the Social 
Democrats, the Left Party (the former Communists) and the Greens – voted against in the 
Parliament. The fear seems to have been that the council would play the political role of 
providing “scientific” support for the liberal-conservative government. The Left Party 
expressed its concerns in the following way: 
 
 “There is reason to assume that the Fiscal Policy Council will be another body providing false scientific 
clothing for the government’s right-wing policy” (Motion 2006/07:Fi7). 
 
These concerns have not been vindicated. The prevailing view in the press has been that 
the council has worked in a politically unbiased way. Both the Social Democrats and the 
Greens seem now to have dropped their opposition to the council. On the other hand, 
there has been an increasingly critical government attitude to the council. In the 
parliamentary hearing regarding the first report in 2008, the Minister for Finance, Anders 
Borg, stated: 
 
“The basic aim of having a fiscal policy council is to add another component to a well-functioning fiscal 




“This report has already demonstrated that the Fiscal Policy Council has an important function”. 
(Finansutskottets betänkande 2007/08FiU20).  
 
These statements can be compared with the Minister’s remarks at a conference in late 
2010: 
 
“I have established the earned income tax credit and the Fiscal Policy Council. I am convinced that at least 
one of the two is very useful. I am very doubtful of the other” (Örn 2010). 
 
To understand the second citation, one should know that the earned income tax credit is 
the Minister’s pet project. The remarks came on top of a series of critical comments about 
the council’s work over several months.   12
  How should one explain this change in attitude? A possible explanation is that, to 
be useful, the analyses of a government watchdog must focus more on the scope for 
improvement than on praising the already good. Therefore, the reports are likely to 
contain substantial parts that are critical of government policies and recommendations on 
what is seen as better ways of achieving the set goals. Since the political opposition’s 
proposals are not subjected to similar critical evaluations, there may be an impression that 
the council is more critical of the incumbent government’s policies than of the 
opposition’s alternatives, even when the reverse is the case. This tendency may be 
reinforced by the media logic that it is more interesting news if the council is critical of 
government policies than if it endorses them.  
  This problem may become less severe over time, as the public will learn that the 
council makes critical evaluations of the policies of all governments. One way to deal 
with the problem already in the short run that has been suggested could be to extend the 
remit also to evaluations of the opposition’s proposals. In the Netherlands, a practice has 
developed according to which the political parties submit their election platforms to the 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB) for evaluation (Bos and Teulings 2010). But these 
evaluations are confined to the budgetary implications of the platforms. Such an 
extension of the remit would seem less appropriate in the Swedish case where the tasks 
are broader, involving evaluations also of employment and growth policies as well as 
evaluations of the transparency of and grounds for policy proposals. Making such broad 
evaluations of both the government’s and the opposition’s economic policy proposals 
would amount very much to acting as a referee in the political process at large. This 
would make it much more difficult to keep clear of political value judgements than when 
judging the government’s policies against well-defined criteria established by the 
political majority. 
 
7. Seven lessons from the Swedish experiences 
I shall end by summarising seven important lessons from the Swedish experiences. 
1.  To earn credibility for independent evaluations, it is crucial that a fiscal council 
does not confound evaluation and monitoring with continuous policy advising, 
especially not advising behind “closed doors”. Such advising is likely to lead to   13
psychological bonds that make impartial evaluation very difficult and would not 
be consistent with a reputation for objectivity. For this reason, the FPC only 
communicates its policy judgements to the government in written reports, public 
announcements and public discussions. 
2.  A composition of a fiscal council where the majority of members are academics 
is probably a good thing. According to the Swedish experience, this has been 
very helpful in keeping out political concerns from the policy evaluations. This 
is much easier to do if one’s main arena is the academic one and one’s future 
career is not likely to be in government administration. There would be a high 
reputational cost in the academic arena for any researcher who would be seen to 
act in a political way in a fiscal council rather than delivering only research-
based judgements. Having an academic position also means that members can 
quit the council and go back to full-time academic work without any significant 
personal sacrifices.
8 
3.  Although a composition of academics does promote independence in a real 
sense, it is also helpful with arrangements that also promote independence in a 
formal  sense. One appropriate arrangement in the Swedish case is that the 
government appoints members after proposals from the FPC itself, which are 
made public. This imposes a reputational cost on the government of not 
following the council’s recommendations and instead making politically 
motivated appointments. But more could be done, for example along the lines of 
what applies to central bank executive boards. This could involve longer terms 
of office, which probably also should be overlapping to ensure only a gradual 
renewal of the council. For the Swedish FPC, the initial terms of office were 
three years, but after the first three-year period, new appointments were made 
for only one year, which has created an undesirable uncertainty. One could also 
question the appropriateness of having the FPC as an ordinary government 
agency. This means that at the same time as the council evaluates the 
                                                 
8 Two of the FPC’s eight members are ex-politicians. For this to work it is required that the ex-politicians 
are really ex and act as such. This has on the whole been the case in Sweden. The presence of the ex-
politicians seems to have strengthened the legitimacy of the council and helped avoid the impression that 
the council’s evaluations are academic products not grounded in reality.   14
government, the council’s performance (in critically evaluating the government) 
is also evaluated by the government according to standard procedures for 
government agencies. This evaluation forms the basis for budget appropriations. 
It is obvious that this could take the relationship between the government and 
the council into an inappropriate grey zone. One way of signalling the 
independence of the council could be to make it instead an agency under the 
Parliament, even though it is unclear how much difference this would make, 
since MPs belonging to the political majority seldom act independently of the 
government.
9 
4.  A fourth conclusion – not an unexpected one from a council chairman – 
concerns the need for adequate funding from the start. Compared both to its 
tasks and to its foreign counterparts, the Swedish FPC was clearly underfunded 
from the beginning, relying instead on the willingness of academic members’ 
ordinary employers (universities and research institutes) to fund their 
employees’ work for the council, which is not a sustainable arrangement. This 
has meant that the council has been obliged to enter into continuous 
negotiations with the government on increased resources. Hopefully, the council 
has had the integrity not to let this affect its judgements, but such a situation is 
awkward. 
5.  The FPC does not make own macroeconomic forecasts, but only evaluates the 
government’s forecasts. This is helpful from the point of promoting 
independence, since making official forecasts – especially if the government 
budget is to build on them – can increase the risk of political pressures. There 
are clear evidence of that from the experiences of the CPB in the Netherlands 
(Bos and Teulings 2010). The risks would seem even greater in the UK, where 
the Office for Budget Responsibility provides the macroeconomic forecast in 
the government’s budget bill. This makes it impossible to avoid a continuous, 
                                                 
9 Two examples of this are Canada and Hungary. In Canada, the Parliamentary Budget Office had its 
budget cut in 2009 after publishing reports critical of the government (Page 2010). The earlier fiscal 
council in Hungary, an agency under the Parliament, was abolished in 2010 after having criticised the 
government for overoptimistic budget projections (Calmfors et al. 2010).   15
behind-closed-doors interaction with the Treasury on numbers, which could 
easily turn into a negotiation process (Calmfors 2010c). 
6.  How broad should a fiscal council’s remit be? There is probably no general 
answer. On the one hand, there is a risk that public interest in fiscal issues is 
crowded out if there are other tasks as well. On the other hand, it might be an 
advantage for the public debate if analyses of various policy areas are delivered 
by a body which has managed to acquire a reputation for good analysis and 
which the public can identify. Another advantage with a broad remit is that it 
makes it more likely that the council’s evaluations of government policy will 
contain both positive and negative elements, which is helpful for maintaining a 
reputation for impartial analysis. In the Swedish case, one should note though 
that the analyses by the council that seem to have annoyed the government the 
most are those of how policies have been explained and motivated. But this 
could just as well be taken as an argument in favour of such a “debate watchdog 
task” – to promote the use of an proper arguments and that citizens are 
presented with as relevant trade-offs as possible is perhaps the most important 
contribution that economists can make to economic policy-making. 
7.  Finally, one should from the onset specify procedures for evaluations of the 
council’s work. This is potentially important for the quality of the work. It is 
perhaps even more important for the council’s legitimacy and for protecting 
against unfair criticism from the political sphere. To reduce the risk that 
evaluations are biased, they should probably be carried out by international 
organisations. 
 
At the moment there is an ongoing discussion in Sweden on the Fiscal Policy Council, 
initiated by an open letter from the council to the government in late 2010 (Swedish 
Fiscal Policy Council 2010). The letter pointed to the need for additional funding as well 
as the desirability of institutional changes strengthening the formal independence of the 
council. The Minister for Finance has expressed his interest in a multi-party agreement on 
such institutional changes. This would be very welcome from the point of view of the 
council. But there appears to be no willingness to increase the council’s funding. Rather,   16
the government seems determined to close all possibilities of temporary “buy-outs” of 
council members from their ordinary employers in order to put a “cap” on the time that 
can be devoted to council work. This represents a serious threat to the scope and quality 
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